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Abstract
Most practical communication links are bi-directional. In these models, since the source node also
receives signals, its encoder has the option of computing its output based on the signals it received in
the past. On the other hand, from a practical point of view, it would also be desirable to identify
the cases where such an encoder design may not improve communication rates. This question is
particularly interesting for the case where the transmitted messages and the feedback signals are subject
to eavesdropping. In this work, we investigate the question of how much impact the feedback has on
the secrecy capacity by studying two fundamental models. First, we consider the Gaussian two-way
wiretap channel and derive an outer bound for its secrecy capacity region. We show that the secrecy
rate loss can be unbounded when feedback signals are not utilized except for a special case we identify,
and thus conclude that utilizing feedback can be highly beneficial in general. Second, we consider a
half-duplex Gaussian two-way relay channel where the relay node is also an eavesdropper, and find that
the impact of feedback is less pronounced compared to the previous scenario. Specifically, the loss in
secrecy rate, when ignoring the feedback, is quantified to be less than 0.5 bit per channel use when the
relay power goes to infinity. This achievable rate region is obtained with simple time sharing along with
cooperative jamming, which, with its simplicity and near optimum performance, is a viable alternative
to an encoder that utilizes feedback signals.
This work was presented in part at the 42nd Asilomar Conference on Signals, System and Computers, October 2008. This
work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation via Grants CCR-0237727, CCF-051483, CNS-0716325, and the
DARPA ITMANET Program via Grant W911NF-07-1-0028.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Most communication links are bi-directional, where the backward channel can carry infor-
mation and/or provides some form of feedback. For example, in ARQ schemes, the backward
channel provides the acknowledgment of receipt of the packets. In peer-to-peer networks, infor-
mation is communicated in both directions. The impact of the existence of bi-directionality on
the channel capacity has been considered extensively up to date. Shannon proposed the two-way
channel model in [1] where communication took place in both directions, and derived the inner
bound and the outer bound on its capacity region. These bounds were shown to match for the
full-duplex Gaussian two-way channel in [2]. An interesting implication of this result is that the
signals received in the past, i.e., the feedback signals, is not needed for encoding to achieve the
capacity region for this model. Though this feature is desirable in practice for simpler encoder
design, it is also known that this approach is suboptimal in general, which was proved in [3]
for a two-way channel where the two nodes share a common output from the channel.
In secure communication, the question of whether feedback signals should be used for en-
coding has been studied in several special scenarios. Shannon showed that a completely secure
backward channel can be used to send a “one-time pad” to increase the secrecy capacity of the
forward channel [4]. In [5], it was proved that such a strategy, where the source node decodes the
key from the destination, is optimal for a degraded wiretap channel with a secure rate limited
noiseless feedback link. Another achievable scheme, which does not require decoding of the
feedback, was first proposed in [6] in the setting of secret key generation and later in [7].
The scheme proves even if the forward channel and backward channel each has zero secrecy
capacity and hence sending key back is not possible, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved
when these two channels are used together. This is done by combining multiple channel uses
and designing codes for the resulting equivalent broadcast channel in which the eavesdropper is
eventually put at its disadvantage because of its lack of side information. Reference [8] combines
this scheme with the key strategy in [4] and shows a higher secrecy rate is achievable for the
model in [7].
In [5], [7], [8], the destination has the freedom to design the feedback signals. References [8],
[9] also considered the scenario where the destination was restricted to sending its observation
of the channel output, and hence could not manipulate the feedback signal to its advantage. It
3was shown that feedback also helped to achieve a higher secrecy rate in this case.
One feature that is common to the coding schemes in [5], [7], [8] is that the eavesdropper
always receives two separate sets of received signals: one from the forward channel and a second
set of signals from the backward channel if it is not secure. While this is more inline with the
conventional information theoretic models with feedback [10, Section 7.12] [11], letting the
eavesdropper receiving the signals of the forward and the backward channel separately might
inadvertently give the eavesdropper an advantage, as compared to superimposing them together.
Specifically, when the eavesdropper receives the sum of the outputs from the forward and the
backward channel, introducing artificial noise into the backward channel at the time when the
forward channel is in use can interfere the eavesdropper’s observation of the forward channel and
hence reduce its recognizance of the message being transmitted on it. This so-called “cooperative
jamming” scheme has been shown to improve secrecy rates in a Gaussian two-way channel with
an external eavesdropper [12]. Yet in reference [12], the source node does not take advantage of
the signals it received from the backward channel when encoding its transmission signals. The
question remains, therefore, in such a “cooperative jamming” scheme, whether the achievable
rates can be improved by utilizing these signals.
In this paper, we consider the wireless communication scenario where the eavesdropper
observes the sum of the outputs of the forward and the backward channel, and hence the
legitimate nodes in the network can potentially utilize both feedback signals and cooperative
jamming to protect the confidential message. We focus on two models where both techniques
are potentially useful: (i) a class of Gaussian full-duplex two-way wiretap channels, and (ii) a
Gaussian half-duplex two-way relay channel with an untrusted relay.
For the first model, we derive a computable outer bound to its secrecy capacity region. We
then compare it to the achievable rates when the feedback is ignored at both nodes. Interestingly,
when the ratio of the power constraint of the two legitimate nodes is fixed and the channel is
fully connected with independent link noise, the gap between the achieved secrecy rate and the
outer bound is bounded by a constant, which only depends on the channel gains.
On the other hand, when the ratio of the power constraints is not fixed, we show that ignoring
feedback signals leads to unbounded loss in the secrecy rate when the power increases. The loss
is measured as the gap between the achievable rate when the feedback is used and the upper
bound when the feedback is not used, hence is not caused by the potential sub-optimality of the
4achievable scheme. This result shows that utilizing the feedback for encoding at the legitimate
nodes is highly beneficial for this model in general.
In the second model, we consider the case where the eavesdropper is part of the network rather
than being external to it. In this model, two nodes wish to exchange information via a relay
node from whom the information needs to be kept secret. Here the relay node is “honest but
curious” [13], in that it will faithfully carry out designated relaying scheme, but is not trusted to
decode the message it is relaying. This kind of setting was first considered in [14] for the three
node relay channel and later thoroughly studied in [15] and [16]. Later, in [17], we considered
a restricted version of the model in this work, by studying the case when the feedback signals
were not used at the source or the destination for encoding purposes. In this paper, we identify
one case where doing so will not incur much loss in secrecy rate. More specifically, we will
prove if the power of the relay goes to ∞, then the loss in the secrecy rates caused by ignoring
the feedback is bounded by 0.5 bit per channel use. Interestingly, a simple TDMA scheme with
cooperative jamming yields the achievable rate.
The channel models in this work are closely related the the channel-type model in secret key
generation literature; see [6], [18]–[21] for example. The major difference from these works is
that our model accepts two inputs, one from the source, the other from the destination. The
eavesdropper observes a noisy superposition of these two inputs. This is more complicated
than the channel-type model where the noisy part of the channel is a wiretap channel which
only accepts one input from the source node, and any input from the destination can only be
transmitted over a noiseless public discussion link which is orthogonal to the wiretap channel.
Recently, reference [22] has considered a channel-type secret key generation model where the
channel component in the model accepts inputs from multiple nodes. Yet, these nodes only
receive from the noiseless public discussion link [22, Section II], which is a fundamentally
different model from those considered in this work.
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the two models
considered in this work. Section III focuses on the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel. Section
IV focuses on the two-way relay channel with an untrusted relay. Section V presents some
alternative proofs to some results in previous sections. Section VI concludes the paper.
Throughout the paper the notation C(x) is defined as C(x) = 1
2
log2(1+x). Also xi denotes the
ith component of vector x, while xi denotes {x1, ...xi}. N (0, σ2) denotes a zero mean Gaussian
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distribution with variance σ2.
II. CHANNEL MODELS
In this section, we describe the two channel models considered in this work. Both models
involve information exchange between two nodes: Node 1 and Node 2. Node 1 wants to send a
message W1 to Node 2. Node 2 wants to send a message W2 to Node 1. Both messages must
be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The encoding functions used at the two nodes are allowed
to be stochastic. Without loss of generality, we use Mj to model the local randomness in the
encoding function used by Node j, j = 1, 2.
A. The Two-Way Wiretap Channel
The first model we consider in this work is a two-way wiretap channel model. The channel
model is shown in Figure 1. The channel description is given by
Pr(Y, Yf , Z|X,Xf) = Pr(Z|X,Xf) Pr(Y |X,Xf , Z) Pr(Yf |Xf , X, Z) (1)
From (1), we observe
Yf − {Xf , X, Z} − Y (2)
is a Markov chain.
At each channel use, Node 1 and Node 2 transmit simultaneously. At the ith channel use, the
encoding function of Node 1 is defined as:
Xi = fi(Y
i−1
f ,W1,M1) (3)
6The encoding function of Node 2 is defined as
Xf,i = gi(Y
i−1,W2,M2) (4)
Note that with the introduction of Mj , j = 1, 2, we can define fi, gi as deterministic encoders.
Also note that another way to define fi is Xi = fi(X i−1, Y i−1f ,M1). It is easy to see that this
definition is equivalent to the definition given in (3).
Let n be the total number of channel uses. Node 2 must decode W1 reliably from Xnf , Y n,M2,W2.
Node 1 must decode W2 reliably from Y nf , Xn,M1,W1. Let the decoding results be Wˆ1 and Wˆ2
respectively. Then we require
lim
n→∞Pr(Wj 6= Wˆj) = 0, j = 1, 2 (5)
Hence, from Fano’s inequality [10], we have
H(W1|Xnf , Y n,M2,W2) < nε1 (6)
H(W2|Y nf , Xn,M1,W1) < nε2 (7)
where εj > 0 and limn→∞ εj = 0, j = 1, 2.
In addition, both messages must be kept secret from the eavesdropper. Hence
I(W1,W2;Z
n) < nε3 (8)
where ε3 > 0 and limn→∞ ε3 = 0.
Define Rj , j = 1, 2 as:
Rj = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Wj), j = 1, 2 (9)
The secrecy rate region is defined as all rate pairs {R1, R2} for which (5) and (8) holds.
The Gaussian case of the two-way wiretap channel model was first proposed in [12] and is
shown in Figure 2. Formally, the channel is described as:
Yf = Xf +N3 +
√
αX (10)
Y = X +N1 +
√
βXf (11)
Z =
√
h1X +
√
h2Xf +N2 (12)
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where
√
α,
√
β,
√
h1,
√
h2 are channel gains. Ni, i = 1, 2, 3 are Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and unit variance, representing the channel noise. We assume that given N2, N1 is
independent from N3:
p(N1, N2, N3) = p(N2)p(N1|N2)p(N3|N2) (13)
We use ρ to denote the correlation factor between N1 and N2. η denotes the correlation factor
between N2 and N3. Obviously, −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, and −1 ≤ η ≤ 1.
From (1) and (13), we readily see this channel belongs to the class of channels described by
(1) and shown in Figure 1.
Observe that the terms
√
αX and
√
βXf are not shown in Figure 2. This is because each
node knows its own transmitted signal and
√
α,
√
β,
√
h1,
√
h2, and can always subtract the
interference caused by its own transmitted signals. Hence we can remove
√
αX and
√
βXf
from (10) and (11). The channel is hence equivalent to
Yf = Xf +N3 (14)
Y = X +N1 (15)
Z =
√
h1X +
√
h2Xf +N2 (16)
In the sequel we shall focus on this equivalent model instead.
Let the power constraint of Node 1 be P . Let the power constraint of Node 2 be Pr.
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[
X2k
]
≤ P (17)
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1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[
X2f,k
]
≤ Pr (18)
Remark 1: When Yf is a constant, or, the feedback is ignored by Node 1, the model reduces
to the relay channel with a confidential message to the relay, which was considered in references
[16], [23], [24].
B. Two-Way Relay Channel with an Untrusted Relay
The second model we consider in this work is the Gaussian two-way relay channel with an
untrusted relay node. The channel model is shown in Figure 3. At any time slot, the channel
either behaves as a MAC channel, shown on the left, or as a broadcast channel, shown on the
right. After normalizing the channel gains, the MAC channel can be expressed as:
Yr = X1 +X2 +N (19)
The broadcast channel can be expressed as:
Y1 =
√
hXr +N1 (20)
Y2 = Xr +N2 (21)
where
√
h is the channel gain, h 6= 0. N , N1, N2 are independent zero mean Gaussian random
variables with unit variance.
We assume Node 1 and Node 2 transmit simultaneously during the MAC mode. Xj,i, j = 1, 2
denote the signals transmitted by Node j during the ith channel use such that the channel is
in MAC mode. i ≥ 1. We use φi to denote the number of channel uses that the channel was
in the broadcast mode before this channel use. The notation X ij denotes the set of signals:
{Xj,k, k = 1...i}.
9Similarly Xr,i denotes the signal transmitted by the relay node during the ith channel use that
the channel is in broadcast mode. i ≥ 1. We use ψi to denote the number of channel uses that
the channel was in the MAC mode before this channel use.
Y1,i, Y2,i, Yr,i are received signals defined in the same fashion.
The channel switches between the MAC mode and the broadcast mode according to a globally
known schedule. We assume the schedule is independent from the local randomness at each node,
the messages and the channel noise. The first mode is assumed to be the MAC mode. The case
where the first mode is a broadcast mode can be viewed as a special case of invoking the MAC
mode first by transmitting nothing during the first MAC mode. The rate loss caused by the
wasted channel use is negligible as the number of channel uses goes to ∞.
Suppose the MAC mode is activated for n channel uses. The broadcast mode is activated for
m channel uses. Hence the communication spans over n +m channel uses. It should be noted
that, in general, neither the n channel uses of the MAC mode, nor the m channel uses of the
broadcast mode have to be consecutive. We assume the schedule is stable, in the sense that the
following limit exists:
α = lim
n+m→∞
n
m+ n
(22)
For a given α, we use {T (α)} to denote a sequence of schedules with increasing total number
of channel uses n+m such that (22) holds, and α is the limit of the time sharing factor of the
MAC mode in the schedule T (α) as n+m→∞.
The average power constraints for the source, the jammer and the relay can be expressed as:
1
m+ n
n∑
k=1
E
[
X2i,k
]
≤ P¯i, i = 1, 2, (23)
1
m+ n
m∑
k=1
E
[
X2r,k
]
≤ P¯r (24)
For the purpose of completeness, we also introduce the notation Pi, i = 1, 2 to denote the
average power of Node i during the MAC mode. Since these two nodes are only transmitting
during the MAC model, Pi and P¯i are related as
Pi = P¯i/α, i = 1, 2 (25)
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Similarly, we use Pr to denote the average power of the relay node during the broadcast mode.
Since the relay node only transmits during the broadcast mode, Pr is related to P¯r as follows:
Pr = P¯r/(1− α) (26)
For the ith channel use in which the channel operates in the MAC mode, the encoding functions
at Node 1, f1,i, is defined as:
X1,i = f1,i(Y
φi
1 ,W1,M1) (27)
Similarly, the encoding functions at Node 2, f2,i, is defined as:
X2,i = f2,i(Y
φi
2 ,W2,M2) (28)
Note that f1,i, f2,i are deterministic functions, and we use Mr to model the local randomness at
the relay. For the ith channel use in which the channel operates in broadcast mode, the encoding
function of the relay node, gi, is defined as:
Xr,i = gi(Y
ψi
r ,Mr) (29)
where gi is a deterministic function.
The eavesdropper knows Y nr , Xmr ,Mr. Therefore, the secrecy constraint is expressed as
lim
m+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2|Y nr , Xmr ,Mr) = limm+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2) (30)
Since W − {Xmr , Y nr } −Mr is a Markov chain, we have
lim
m+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2|Y nr , Xmr ,Mr) = limm+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2|Y nr , Xmr ) (31)
Therefore, the secrecy constraint can be expressed as
lim
m+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2|Y nr , Xmr ) = limm+n→∞
1
m+ n
H(W1,W2) (32)
Let Wˆj, j = 1, 2 be the decoding result computed by the intended receiver of Wj , j = 1, 2.
Then the reliable communication requirement is expressed as
lim
m+n→∞Pr(Wˆj 6= Wj) = 0, j = 1, 2 (33)
Define R1, R2 as
Rj = lim
m+n→∞
1
n+m
H(Wj), j = 1, 2 (34)
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The secrecy capacity region is defined as the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) such that there is
an α, a sequence of schedule {T (α)} and a choice of encoding function for which (32) and (33)
are satisfied.
Remark 2: In general,
lim
n+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W |Xmr , Y nr ) 6= limn+m→∞
1
n+m
H (W |Y nr ) (35)
This can be proved by a counterexample: Consider the communication protocol:
1) First the relay node randomly generates and broadcasts a key via Xr to Node 1 and Node
2 using a channel code.
2) Node 1 uses the key as a one-time pad [4] to encrypt its confidential message W and
sends it to the relay using a channel code. The other nodes remain silent.
3) The relay decodes the codeword sent by Node 1 and encodes and forwards it to the
destination.
4) The destination recovers the codeword sent by Node 1 by decoding the signals from the
relay. It then decrypts it with the key it received in step 1 and recovers W .
Since the one-time pad is a perfectly secure cipher [4], for this communication protocol, we
have:
H (W ) = H (W |Y nr ) (36)
However, since the key is determined by Xmr , given the key, W is uniquely determined by Y nr .
Therefore, we have
H (W |Xmr , Y nr ) = 0 6= H(W |Y nr ) (37)
III. FEEDBACK IN THE TWO-WAY WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Improvement on the Known Achievable Secrecy Rate: A Motivating Example
For the two-way wiretap channel, reference [12] derived an achievable rate using Gaussian
codebooks. However, in this scheme, the signal Yf received by Node 1 is not used to compute
the signal X transmitted by Node 1. Likewise, the signal Y received by Node 2 is not used to
compute the signal Xf transmitted by Node 2. We next show that this scheme can be improved
12
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upon with respect to the achievable secrecy rate. To show this, it is sufficient to show that a
larger R1 is achievable for Node 1 for a set of channel gains. In the following, we provide such
an example.
We assume ρ = 0, η = 0, which means N1, N2, N3 are all independent, which was the setting
considered by [12]. The largest rate for Node 1 achievable with the scheme of [12] is given by:
R1 = [C (P )− C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)
]+ (38)
which is achieved by letting Node 2 transmit an i.i.d. Gaussian sequence with variance Pr.
When h1
h2Pr+1
≥ 1, we observe from (38) that the secrecy rate is always 0. Below, we choose
P = 3, Pr = 1,
√
h1 =
√
2,
√
h2 = 1 such that this condition is fulfilled and prove a positive
secrecy rate is achievable with our scheme.
The coding scheme we use is similar to that of [6]. It is composed of one channel use described
in Figure 4, followed by one channel use described in Figure 5. In an odd step, Node 1 sends a
signal denoted by J1 and Node 2 sends a signal denoted by X2. After this step, Node 1 adds its
received signal X2 +N3 to a new signal X1 and transmits it in the following even step. At the
13
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same time, Node 2 sends a signal denoted by J2. We use the notation Ni to denote the channel
noise in the odd step and N ′i to denote the channel noise in the even step.
Combining these two steps, we obtain an equivalent memoryless channel shown in Figure 6.
The achievable secrecy rate for this channel is given by [25]:
[I (X1; Y )− I (X1; Ye,1, Ye,2)]+ (39)
where
Y = X1 +N3 +N
′
1 (40)
Ye,1 = X2 +
√
2J1 +N2 (41)
Ye,2 =
√
2 (X1 +X2 +N3) + J2 +N
′
2 (42)
We then choose X1, X2, J1, J2 as zero mean independent Gaussian random variables with unit
variance. From Figures 4 and 5, this choice satisfies the average power constraints. Evaluating
(39) for this distribution, we get
C
(
1
2
)
− C

 a2
2a2 + 2− a2
a2+2

 > 0 (43)
where a =
√
2.
Since the original channel takes twice as many channel uses to implement this scheme, the
actual secrecy rate is half the value indicated by (43). However, this still means a positive secrecy
rate is achievable.
This means that utilizing feedback signals leads to higher achievable secrecy rate for this
channel.
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B. Outer Bound
Although we have shown that using feedback can improve the secrecy rate, it remains unclear
whether this can only be done by letting Node 1 use the signal Y to compute X . If the signal Y
is not available to Node 1, is it possible to achieve the same rate via a smarter way to compute
Xr at Node 2? Additionally, if ignoring Y at Node 1 is suboptimal, is it possible to bound the
consequent rate loss? To answer these questions, clearly, we need an outer bound on the secrecy
capacity region of this model.
We begin by deriving a bound on R1.
Theorem 1: For the channel model in Figure 1, R1 is upper bounded by
max
Pr(X,Xf )
min{I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X)} (44)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 3: Ignoring Yf at Node 1 is equivalent to viewing Yf as a constant. From (44), R1,
in this case, is upper bounded by
max
Pr(X,Xf )
min{I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I(Xf ;Z|X)} (45)
which is the upper bound proved in [24].
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity region of the channel model in Figure 1 is bounded by
∪Pr(X,Xf) {(R1, R2) : (47) (48) (49) holds} (46)
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I (X ; Y ) (47)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I (Xf ; Yf) (48)
R1 +R2 ≤ min


I (X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I (Xf ;Z, Yf |X) ,
I (Xf ; Yf |Z,X) + I (X ;Z, Y |Xf)

 (49)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
For a deterministic binary wire-tap channel, Theorem 2 leads to the equivocation capacity region,
as shown by the following theorem:
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Theorem 3: When X,Xf are binary and Y = X ⊕ Xf , Yf = Xf ⊕ X,Z = X ⊕ Xf , the
secrecy capacity region is given by
Rj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2 (50)
R1 +R2 ≤ 1 (51)
Proof: The achievability follows from [26, Theorem 2]. The converse follows from Theorem
2. The sum rate bound specializes as follows:
I (X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I (Xf ; Yf , Z|X) (52)
=I (X ;X|X ⊕Xf , Xf) + I (Xf ;Xf , X ⊕Xf |X) (53)
=I (X ;X|X,Xf) + I (Xf ;Xf , X|X) (54)
=I (Xf ;Xf , X|X) (55)
≤H (Xf) ≤ 1 (56)
We next consider the Gaussian channel.
Theorem 4: When Yf is a constant, i.e., Yf is ignored by Node 1, the secrecy rate R1 is upper
bounded by
inf
σ2≥0
C

 P
(
1 + σ2 −√h1ρ
)2
(1 + σ2 − ρ2) (h1P + 1 + σ2)

+ C
(
h2Pr
1 + σ2
)
(57)
Proof: Define N4 as a Gaussian random variable such that N4 ∼ N (0, σ2) and is independent
from Ni, i = 1, 2, 3. Recall that Z is the signal received by the eavesdropper. We next consider
a channel where the eavesdropper receives Z + N4. Since Z +N4 is a degraded version of Z,
we can find an upper bound of the original channel by deriving an upper bound for this new
channel. This upper bound is found by applying the bound (45).
We next prove that all terms in the upper bound (45) is maximized when X,Xf are independent
and each has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and maximum possible variance: I(X ; Y )
is obviously maximized by this distribution. For the other two terms, we have:
I (X ; Y |Xf , Z) (58)
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=I
(
X ;X +N1|Xf ,
√
h1X +
√
h2Xf +N2 +N4
)
(59)
=h
(
X +N1|Xf ,
√
h1X +
√
h2Xf +N2 +N4
)
− h (N1|N2 +N4) (60)
≤h
(
X +N1|
√
h1X +N2 +N4
)
− h (N1|N2 +N4) (61)
and
I (Xf ;Z|X) (62)
=I
(
Xf ;
√
h2Xf +N2 +N4|X
)
(63)
=h
(√
h2Xf +N2 +N4|X
)
− h (N2 +N4) (64)
≤h
(√
h2Xf +N2 +N4
)
− h (N2 +N4) (65)
Equations (61) and (65) show that the second term in (45) is maximized when X and Xf are
independent. Moreover, (61) is known to be maximized when X has a Gaussian distribution
with the maximum possible variance; see [27]. (65) is also maximized when Xf has a Gaussian
distribution with the maximum possible variance. Hence we have shown the optimal input
distribution for X,Xf is an independent Gaussian distribution. For this distribution, it can be
verified the second term in (45) becomes (57).
Hence we have proved the theorem.
Remark 4: When σ2 → ∞, (57) converges to C(P ), which corresponds to the first term in
(45). Thus, (57) is written as one term instead of the two terms as in (45).
Remark 5: We introduce N4 to further tighten the bound. For example, consider the case
where ρ = η = 0. In this case the upper bound can be expressed as
min
0≤α≤1
C
(
P
αh1P + 1
)
+ C (αh2Pr) (66)
where α = 1/(1 + σ2). Consider choosing the remaining parameters as h1 = 1, h2 = 10,
P = 100, Pr = 5. It can be verified that the minimum is attained around α = 0.09, and not at
σ2 = 0. Hence, the bound presented here is tighter than the bound in [24].
Next, we present the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel is outer
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bounded by
0 ≤ R1 ≤ C(P ) (67)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ C(Pr) (68)
R1 +R2 ≤ min


infσ2≥0C
(
P(1+σ2−
√
h1ρ)
2
(1+σ2−ρ2)(h1P+1+σ2)
)
+ C
(
Pr(h2+1+σ2−2
√
h2η)
1+σ2−η2
)
infσ2≥0C
(
Pr(1+σ2−
√
h2η)
2
(1+σ2−η2)(h2Pr+1+σ2)
)
+ C
(
P(h1+1+σ2−2
√
h1ρ)
1+σ2−ρ2
)


(69)
Proof: Again we consider a channel where the eavesdropper receives Z + N4 and derive
an outer bound for this new channel. N4 is as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.
To prove the theorem, we first show I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y |Z,Xf), I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X), I(Xf ; Yf),
I(Xf ; Yf |Z,Xf) and I(X ;Z, Y |Xf) are maximized simultaneously when X and Xf are inde-
pendent, X ∼ N (0, P ), and Xf ∼ N (0, Pr).
Due to the symmetry of the channel model, we only need to show I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y |Z,Xf)
and I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X) are maximized by this distribution.
The case of I(X ; Y |Z,Xf) was shown in the proof of Theorem 4.
For I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X), we have:
I (Xf ; Yf , Z|X) (70)
=I
(
Xf ;Xf +N3,
√
h2Xf +N2 +N4|X
)
(71)
=h
(√
h2Xf +N2 +N4, Xf +N3|X
)
− h (N2 +N4, N3) (72)
≤h
(√
h2Xf +N2 +N4, Xf +N3
)
− h (N2 +N4, N3) (73)
Hence I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X) is maximized when X and Xf are independent, X ∼ N (0, P ), and
Xf ∼ N (0, Pr). The theorem then is a consequence of Theorem 2 when evaluated at this input
distribution.
Remark 6: The introduction of N4 is again useful in tightening the bound. For example,
consider the case where ρ = η = 0, h1 = 1, h2 = 10, P = 100, Pr = 5.
In this case the upper bound on R1, which is C(P ), is about 3.3291. The first term inside the
minimum in (69), which is also an upper bound on R1 takes the form:
min
0≤α≤1
C
(
P
αh1P + 1
)
+ C (Pr (αh2 + 1)) (74)
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where α = 1/(1 + σ2). It can be verified that the minimum is smaller than 3.24 and is attained
around α = 0.32. Hence the upper bound on R1 is dominated by the first term inside the
minimum in (69) and is not attained at σ2 = 0.
C. Achievable Rates for the Gaussian Two-way Wiretap Channel
Let us use [x]+ to denote max{x, 0}. Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6: Define R∗1 as
R∗1 = max
0≤α≤1
α

C (P )−

C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)
− 1− α
α
[
C (Pr)− C
(
h2Pr
h1P + 1
)]+
+

+
(75)
and R∗2 as
R∗2 = max
0≤α≤1
α

C (Pr)−

C
(
h2Pr
h1P + 1
)
− 1− α
α
[
C (P )− C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)]+
+

+
(76)
Define the region R as the convex hull of the following three rate pairs of (R1, R2):
(0, 0), (R∗1, 0), (0, R
∗
2) (77)
The rate region R is achievable.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.
Remark 7: The achievable scheme is composed of two phases. During phase one, with a time
sharing factor of 1− α, Node 2 sends a key to Node 1. During phase two, Node 1 utilizes this
key to encrypt its message and transmits the result to Node 2. Hence when α = 1, R is achieved
when both nodes ignore their received signals when computing their transmitting signals.
Remark 8: The achievable secrecy rate derived here may be potentially improved further by
combining it with the scheme in Section III-A. However, as we shall see later, Theorem 6 is
sufficient to bound the rate loss when the feedback signals are not used by the legitimate nodes.
D. Comparing the achievable rates and the outer bound
We first consider the case with independent link noise, which is the model considered in [12].
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1) ρ = η = 0:
Theorem 7: When ρ = η = 0, Pr = kP , k is a positive constant, and hj 6= 0, j = 1, 2, the
loss in secrecy rates when received signals are not used to compute transmitting signals at Node
j, j = 1, 2 is bounded by a constant, which is only a function of h1 and h2.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 8: Even in the case where cooperative jamming is possible (hj 6= 0, j = 1, 2), when
P is not proportionally increasing with Pr, ignoring Yf at Node 1 can lead to unbounded loss
in the secrecy rate.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix E.
We next consider a special case of the model that attracted some interest in the past [24],
[28]. In this model, Z is a degraded version of Y given Xf , and Yf is ignored by Node 1:
2) h1 ≤ 1, ρ =
√
h1 and Yf is a constant: In this case, N2 can be written as
√
h1N1 + N
′
2,
where N ′2 is independent from N1, N3 and N ′2 ∼ N (0, 1− h1). Then the signals received by the
eavesdropper Z can be expressed as:
Z =
√
h1X +
√
h2Xf +
√
h1N1 +N
′
2 (78)
=
√
h1 (X +N1) +N
′
2 +
√
h2Xf (79)
From this, we observe that, given Xf , Z is a degraded version of Y = X +N1.
Corollary 1: When h1 ≤ 1, ρ =
√
h1, and h2 6= 0, Yf is a constant, then the achievable rate
of R1 using cooperative jamming is at most 0.5 bit per channel use from the secrecy capacity.
Remark 9: Corollary 1 was first proposed in [28] and later appeared in [24]. Here we first
describe the approach of [24]:
From Theorem 6 and Remark 7, the achievable rate for R1 in this case is obtained by letting
α = 1 and evaluating R∗1. In this case
R1 = C(P )− C( h1P
h2Pr + 1
) (80)
The upper bound proposed in [24] on R1 is
min{C(P ), C(P )− C(h1P ) + C(h2Pr)} (81)
Here we observe (81) can be obtained from (57) when evaluated with σ2 → ∞ and σ2 = 0.
Reference [24] proves Corollary 1 by comparing (80) and (81). It can be then verified that the
gap between (80) and (81) is less than 0.5 bit per channel use.
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Fig. 7. Two-way wiretap Channel with Additional Public Noiseless Forward Link
The approach of reference [28] is different and uses results on a wiretap channel with noisy
feedback. This proof is delegated to Section V.
IV. FEEDBACK IN HALF-DUPLEX TWO-WAY RELAY CHANNEL WITH AN UNTRUSTED
RELAY
In this section, we derive the outer bound for the secrecy capacity region of the two-way relay
channel with an untrusted relay in Section II-B (Figure 3). To find the outer bound, we first
consider the channel in Figure 7.
We assume X1 and X2 have the same power constraint as the X1, X2 in Figure 3. Mr is now
accessible to Node 1 and delivered to the other nodes via a public noiseless link. The remaining
part of the channel is activated when the original two-way relay channel is in the MAC mode,
and is inactive when the original two-way relay channel model is in the broadcast mode. Doing
so ensures the overall number of channel uses to be the same between these two models.
Recall that Mj , j = 1, 2 still models the local randomness at Node j, j = 1, 2. The encoding
function of Node 1 at the ith channel use when the channel is active can be defined as:
X1,i = f˜1,i(Y
i−1
1 ,W1,M1,Mr) (82)
Similarly, the encoding function of Node 2 at the ith channel use when the channel is active
can be defined as:
X2,i = f˜2,i(Y
i−1
2 ,W2,M2,Mr) (83)
With these preparations, we present the following theorem:
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Theorem 9: The secrecy rate region of the channel in Figure 7 includes the secrecy capacity
region of the two-way relay channel in Figure 3.
Proof: Consider the model in Figure 3. Suppose during a MAC mode, a genie reveals
X1+X2+N to Node 1 and Node 2. We also add a public noiseless link that takes inputs from
Node 1 and provides outputs to Node 2 and the relay. We make Mr accessible to Node 1 and
use the public noiseless link to deliver Mr to Node 2 and the relay. This side information does
not increase the knowledge of the relay and hence will not decrease the secrecy capacity region
of the channel.
During a broadcast mode, a genie reveals the link noise level N2 to Node 2. Similarly, the
link noise N1 is revealed to Node 1. This side information will not decrease the secrecy capacity
region of the channel either.
With the side information provided to the nodes, the links from the relay to Node 1, 2 can be
removed. This is because
1) Node 1 and Node 2 have the signal received by the relay X1 +X2 +N .
2) Node 1 sends Mr via the public noiseless forward link. With Mr available at Node 2, it
can compute the signal transmitted by the relay node. Due to the same reason, Node 1
knows the signal transmitted by the relay node as well.
3) With noise N2 available at Node 2, Node 2 can compute the signal it received from the
relay. For similar reasons, Node 1 can compute the signal it received from the relay as
well.
Since N1, N2, N are independent, N1 and N2 can be incorporated as the local randomness at
Node 1 and Node 2 respectively.
After removing the links from the relay to Node 1, 2, the channel indeed becomes that which
is described by Figure 7, where Node 3 corresponds to the relay node whose output broadcast
link to Node 1, 2 is removed. Since, every step we took during this transformation could only
expand the secrecy capacity region, we have proved the theorem.
To derive an outer bound for the secrecy capacity of the channel in Figure 7, we first consider
the case when the channel is active regardless of whether the two-way relay channel is in MAC
mode or broadcast mode. We recognize that in this case, the channel becomes a special case
of the two-way wiretap channel defined in Section II. Utilizing this connection leads to the
following corollary:
22
Corollary 2: The secrecy capacity region of the channel in Figure 7 is outer bounded by
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
C
(
P¯1
)
, C
(
P¯2
)}
(84)
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0 (85)
where P¯i is the average power constraint of Node i.
Proof: The channel in Figure 7 is a special case of the channel defined in (1), where
Y, Yf , Z,X,Xf (86)
correspond to
{X1 +N,Mr}, X2 +N, {X1 +X2 +N,Mr}, {X1,Mr}, X2 (87)
respectively, and Pr(Y, Yf , Z|X,Xf) becomes Pr(N).
Therefore the corollary follows as a direct consequence of Theorem 5 with η = ρ = 1,
h1 = h2 = 1, σ
2 = 0.
Note that to apply Corollary 2 to the half-duplex two-way relay channel, we need to take
into account the channel uses when the channel in Figure 7 is inactive during the channel uses
when the original two-way relay channel is in the broadcast mode. Hence, the outer bound in
Corollary 2 becomes the following region A:
R1 +R2 ≤ αmin
{
C
(
P¯1/α
)
, C
(
P¯2/α
)}
(88)
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0 (89)
which reflects the number of channel uses during which some nodes are inactive.
Define region B as
0 ≤ R1 ≤ (1− α)C(P¯r/(1− α)) (90)
0 ≤ R2 ≤ (1− α)C(hP¯r/(1− α)) (91)
Then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 10: An outer bound for the secrecy capacity of two-way relay channel is given by
∪0≤α≤1{A ∩B} (92)
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Proof: Region A follows by applying Corollary 2 and taking into account the fact that the
channel is inactive when the original two-way relay channel is in broadcast mode as described
above.
Region B follows from removing the secrecy constraint and applying the cut-set bound in
[10, Theorem 15.10.1]. To derive (91), we consider the cut where the set T includes the relay
node and Node 2. From the cut-set bound, we get:
H(W2) ≤ mI(X2, Xr; Y1|X1) + (m+ n)ε (93)
ε > 0 and limm+n→∞ ε = 0.
Therefore, we get
1
m+ n
H(W2) ≤ m
m+ n
I(X2, Xr; Y1|X1) + ε (94)
It is easy to see that for the Gaussian two-way relay channel, I(X2, Xr; Y1|X1) is maximized
when X1, X2, Xr takes an independent Gaussian distribution with maximum possible variance.
Let m+ n → ∞, and use the fact that limm+n→∞ mm+n = 1 − α, we obtain (91) by evaluating
(94) for this distribution.
Equation (90) is derived similarly due to the symmetry of the channel model.
Hence we proved the theorem.
Remark 10: When P¯r → ∞, and h 6= 0, then the region is maximized when α → 1. The
outer bound becomes:
R1 +R2 ≤ min
{
C
(
P¯1
)
, C
(
P¯2
)}
(95)
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0 (96)
A. Comparison with Achievable Rates
In this section, we compare the outer bound with the achievable secrecy rate region.
We begin by restating an achievable rate for R1 from [17]. The rate region then follows from
time sharing.
Theorem 11: [17, Theorem 1] The following secrecy rate of R1 is achievable for the model
in Figure 3:
0 ≤ R1 ≤ max
0≤P ′
1
≤P¯1/α,0<α<1
α
[
C
(
P ′1
(1 + σ2c )
)
− C
(
P ′1
(1 + P2)
)]+
(97)
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where σ2c is the variance of the Gaussian quantization noise determined by:
αC
(
P ′1 + 1
σ2c
)
= (1− α)C (Pr) (98)
P2 was defined in (25), Pr was defined in (26).
Remark 11: The achievable scheme above uses compress-and-forward. And Node 1 and 2
ignore their received signals when computing the transmitted signals. The proof can be found
in [17].
Remark 12: For any fixed α such that 0 < α < 1, if the power of the relay P¯r → ∞, then
σ2c → 0, the achievable rate converges to
α(C(P1)− C( P1
1 + P2
)) (99)
Equation (99) is a monotonic increasing function of α. Hence, as long as α < 1, we can always
increase α and increase the achievable secrecy rate. Therefore, when P¯r →∞, the optimal time
sharing factor α→ 1. The achievable rate then converges to
C(P¯1)− C( P¯1
1 + P¯2
) (100)
The secrecy rate region is obtained with time sharing and it converges to
R1 +R2 ≤ C(P¯1)− C( P¯1
1 + P¯2
) (101)
R1 ≥ 0, R2 ≥ 0 (102)
Utilizing this result, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3: When P¯r → ∞, the gap between the outer bound and the achievable rate is
bounded by 0.5 bit per channel use.
To prove this corollary, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Define the following functions:
f(x, y) =
1
2
log2
(
(1 + x)(1 + y)
1 + x+ y
)
(103)
g(x, y) = min{C(x), C(y)} (104)
Let h(x, y) = g(x, y)− f(x, y). Then 0 ≤ h(x, y) ≤ 0.5.
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Fig. 8. A wiretap channel with noisy feedback
Proof: Without loss of generality x ≤ y. For x ≥ y, simply exchange x and y. h(x, y) is
given by
h(x, y) =
1
2
log2
(
1 + x+ y
1 + y
)
(105)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
1 + x
1 + y
)
(106)
≤1
2
log2(1 + 1) = 0.5 (107)
Clearly h(x, y) ≥ 0. Hence 0 ≤ h(x, y) ≤ 0.5.
Corollary 3 can then be proved by letting x = P¯1, y = P¯2. The upper bound on the sum rate and
the achievable sum secrecy rate then become g(x, y) and f(x, y) when P¯r →∞. Using Lemma
1 we prove the gap between the upper bound and lower bound of the sum secrecy rate is less
than 0.5 bit per channel use. Since the achievable region and the outer bound are only different
on the bounds for the sum rate, this proves the gap between the inner bound and outer bound
of the secrecy capacity region is also less than 0.5 bit per channel use when P¯r → ∞. Hence
we have proved Corollary 3.
V. ALTERNATIVE PROOFS OF COROLLARY 1 AND COROLLARY 2
Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 can also be proved by using results on the wiretap channel with
noisy feedback [28]. In this section we provide these proofs for completeness.
A. A Wiretap channel with noisy feedback
The channel model is shown in Figure 8. Node 1 sends a message W to Node 2, which must
be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The channel is described by
Pr(Y, Z, Yf |X,Xf ) = Pr(Y, Z|X) Pr(Yf |Xf) (108)
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Within each channel use, Node 1 and Node 2 take turns to transmit. This implies that, Figure 8
is not a special case of the two-way wiretap channel in Figure 1. Without loss of generality, we
assume Node 2 transmits first.
At the ith channel use, the encoding function of Node 1 is defined as:
Xi = fi(Y
i
f ,W,M1) (109)
Note that since Node 2 transmits first, Node 1 has an extra sample of Yf to use when computing
its transmitted signals. Therefore in (109), Y if is used instead of Y i−1f .
The encoding function of Node 2 is defined as
Xf,i = gi(Y
i−1,M2) (110)
fi, gi are deterministic functions.
Let n be the total number of channel uses. The destination must decode W reliably from
Xnf , Y
n,M2. Hence from Fano’s inequality, we have
H(W |Xnf , Y n,M2) < nε4 (111)
where ε4 > 0 and limn→∞ ε4 = 0.
The message W must be kept secret from the eavesdropper. Hence
I(W ;Zn) < nε5 (112)
where ε5 > 0 and limn→∞ ε5 = 0.
Theorem 12: The secrecy capacity of the channel model in Figure 8 is upper bounded by
Re ≤ max
Pr(X,Xf )
min{I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y |Z) + I(Xf ; Yf)} (113)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix F.
Corollary 4: If X − Y − Z is a Markov chain, the secrecy capacity of the channel model in
in Figure 8 is given by
max
Pr(X,Xf )
min{I(X ; Y ), I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z) + I(Xf ; Yf)} (114)
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Proof: Equation (114) is achievable because of [8, Theorem 3.1]. In details, the rate (114)
can be obtained by letting Vf = X , Yf = Y , Zf = Z, Uf = φ, Vb = Xf , Yb = Yf , Zb = φ in [8,
Theorem 3.1].
When X − Y −Z is a Markov chain, we notice I(X ; Y |Z) = I(X ; Y )− I(X ;Z). Hence the
achievable (114) matches the upper bound in (113).
Remark 13: When the backward channel Pr(Yf |Xf) is a rate limited noiseless link, whose
rate is Rf , then I(Xf ; Yf) = H(Xf) = Rf . Then using Corollary 4, we obtain the result in [5].
B. Alternative Proof of Corollary 1
Theorem 13: For the degraded case considered in Section III-D2, R1 is upper bounded by
min{C(P ), C(h2
h1
P¯r)} (115)
where P¯r = Pr + 1−h1h2 .
Remark 14: Since h1 ≤ 1, it can be verified that the upper bound in (115) is looser than (81).
However, this bound is sufficient to prove the 0.5 bit gap result.
Proof:
We begin by redrawing the channel model in Figure 9, where N ′2 is a zero mean Gaussian
random variable with variance 1− h1.
The first term C(P ) follows by removing the eavesdropper and applying the upper bound for
Gaussian two-way channel from [2].
In order to obtain the second term in (115), we convert the model in Figure 9 to the model in
Figure 10. In this new model, N ′2 is removed, and the power constraint of Node 2 is increased
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Fig. 11. The model with feedback
from Pr to P¯r = Pr+ 1−h1h2 . Since Node 2 can always use this additional power to transmit noise
which is statistically equivalent to N2, the secrecy capacity of Figure 10 is greater or equal to
the secrecy capacity of Figure 9.
We next prove that the secrecy capacity of the model in Figure 11 must be greater or equal
to the secrecy capacity of the channel model in Figure 10. Figure 11 is a special case of the
wiretap channel with noisy feedback. For this model, the encoding functions used by Node 1
and 2 at the ith channel use are denoted by fi and gi and are defined in (109) and (110). The
power constraint of Node 2 is h2
h1
P¯r. Node 1 is not constrained in transmission power.
We prove that any signaling scheme in Figure 10 can be simulated by Figure 11. This means
for any set of encoding functions of Node 1 and 2, denoted by {f˜i} {g˜i} respectively in Figure 10,
we can find encoding functions {fi}, {gi} for Figure 11, such that given the same noise sequence
Nf = N1 and the same local randomness Mj , j = 1, 2, the message can be reliably received by
Node 2 at the same secrecy rate. This can be shown as follows:
We choose fi, the encoding function used by Node 1 in Figure 11 as:
Xi = Yf,i + f˜i (W,M1) (116)
29
gi, the encoding function used by Node 2 in Figure 11 is chosen as:
Xf,i =
√
h2
h1
g˜i(X
i−1 −X i−1f ,M2) (117)
Then, as shown below, if X i−1f =
√
h2
h1
X i−1r , then Xf,i =
√
h2
h1
Xr,i. The notation f˜ i−1(M1,W )
stands for f˜j(M1,W ), j = 1, ..., i− 1.
We begin with:
Xf,i =
√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
X i−1 −X i−1f ,M2
)
(118)
Using (116), we get:
Xf,i =
√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
Y i−1f + f˜
i−1 (W,M1)−X i−1f ,M2
)
(119)
=
√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
X i−1f +N
i−1
f + f˜
i−1 (W,M1)−X i−1f ,M2
)
(120)
=
√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
N i−1f + f˜
i−1 (W,M1) ,M2
)
(121)
Since N i−1f = N i−11 , (121) equals:√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
N i−11 + f˜
i−1 (W,M1) ,M2
)
(122)
Since X i−1 = f˜ i−1(W,M1), (122) equals√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
N i−11 +X
i−1,M2
)
(123)
=
√
h2
h1
g˜i
(
Y i−1,M2
)
(124)
=
√
h2
h1
Xr,i (125)
Hence, when n channel uses are involved, we have Xnf =
√
h2
h1
Xnr .
Using this result, from (116) we have
Xi = Yf,i + f˜i (W,M1) (126)
= Xf,i +Nf,i + f˜i (W,M1) (127)
=
√
h2
h1
Xr,i +N1,i + f˜i (W,M1) (128)
=
√
h2
h1
Xr,i +N1,i +Xi = Zi (129)
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Fig. 12. Two-way model with one-sided secure link
Therefore the signals received by the eavesdropper in Figure 11 is the same signals received by
the eavesdropper in Figure 10.
The destination in Figure 11 knows Xf,i. Therefore, it can compute f˜i (W,M1) + Nf,i from
Xi−Xf,i. On the other hand, f˜i (W,M1)+Nf,i = f˜i (W,M1)+N1,i is exactly the signal received
by Node 2 in Figure 10 at the ith channel use. This fact, along with the fact that Xr,i = Xf,i,
shows that the destination in Figure 11 can compute any signal known by the destination in
Figure 10. This means that, if W can be reliably received in Figure 10, it can also be reliably
received in Figure 11 at the same rate.
Hence we have proved that an upper bound for the secrecy capacity of Figure 11 is an upper
bound for Figure 10. From Corollary 4 it follows that the secrecy capacity of Figure 11 is
C(h2
h1
P¯r). Applying it to Figure 10, we obtained the second term in the upper bound (115).
Hence we have the theorem.
The 0.5 bit gap then follows from Lemma 1. In our case, the achievable rate can be expressed
as f(x, y) where x = P , y = h2
h1
P¯r. The upper bound can be expressed as h(x, y). Hence from
Lemma 1, we proved the gap between the achievable rate (80) and the upper bound (115) can
not exceed 0.5 bits per channel use.
C. Alternative Proof of Corollary 2
Consider the channel in Figure 12. It is the same channel as Figure 11 except that the power
constraint of Node 2 is changed to P2. Again it is a a special case of the wiretap channel with
noisy feedback. For this model, the encoding functions used by Node 1 and 2 at the ith channel
use are denoted by fi and gi and are defined in (109) and (110). W is replaced by W1.
Theorem 14: The secrecy rate for the channel in Figure 12, where each node takes turn to
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transmit and Node 2 transmits first, is greater than or equal to the maximal achievable individual
rate R1 of the channel in Figure 7.
Proof: We prove the theorem by showing any coding scheme of Figure 7 can be simulated
by the channel in Figure 12. This means for any set of encoding functions of node j, {f˜j,i},
j = 1, 2, in Figure 7, we can find encoding functions for Node 1 and Node 2 in Figure 12,
such that at the same secrecy rate the message W1 can be reliably received by Node 2. For the
encoding functions defined in (82) and (83), we choose the encoding functions for Figure 12
are chosen as:
Xi = f˜1,i
(
Y i−1f ,W1,M1,Mr
)
+ Yf,i (130)
Xf,i = f˜2,i
(
X i−1 −X i−1f ,W2,M2,Mr
)
(131)
Mr is obtained by letting Node 1 transmitting it over the noiseless public forward link. Then,
with these encoding functions, the eavesdropper receives exactly the same signal as the signal
received by the eavesdropper in Figure 7, if these two models experience the same noise sequence
Nf = N and the same local randomness Mj , j = 1, 2,Mr. This can be proved as follows:
We begin by assuming X i−1f = X i−12 , and prove Xf,i = X2,i and Xi − Yf,i = X1,i.
To prove Xf,i = X2,i, we compare (131) with (83) and find that we need to prove X i−1 −
X i−1f = Y
i−1
2 . We begin with
X i−1 −X i−1f = X i−1 − Y i−1f +N i−1f (132)
From (130), we have
X i−1 − Y i−1f (133)
=f˜ i−11
(
Y i−1f ,W1,M1,Mr
)
(134)
Since we assume X i−1f = X i−12 and N i−1f = N i−1, we get
Y i−1f = X
i−1
f +N
i−1
f = X
i−1
2 +N
i−1 = Y i−11 (135)
Hence (134) equals
f˜ i−11
(
Y i−11 ,W1,M1,Mr
)
= X i−11 (136)
The equality in (136) follows from (82). Hence X i−1 −X i−1f = X i−11 and (132) equals:
X i−1 −X i−1f = X i−11 +N i−1f = X i−11 +N i−1 = Y i−12 (137)
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Hence from (137) we have shown
Xf,i = X2,i (138)
From (135), by comparing (130) with (82), we get
Xi − Yf,i = X1,i (139)
From (138) and (139), we get
Xi = X1,i + Yf,i = X1,i +Xf,i +Nf,i = X1,i +X2,i +Ni (140)
Until this point, we have shown that the signals received by the eavesdroppers in the two models
in Figure 12 and Figure 7 are identical.
From (139), we get
Y2,i = X1,i +Ni = Xi − Yf,i +Ni = Xi − Yf,i +Nf,i = Xi −Xf,i (141)
Hence Node 2 in Figure 12 can recover the signals received by Node 2 in Figure 7. On the other
hand, since Xf,i = X2,i, Node 2 in Figure 12 can also recover the signals transmitted by Node
2 in Figure 7. This means if a message can be reliably decoded at a certain rate by Node 2 in
Figure 7, it can also be decoded reliably by Node 2 in Figure 7 at the same rate.
Hence we have proved the theorem.
The secrecy capacity of the model in Figure 12 is given by Corollary 4. From Corollary 4,
we know R1 ≤ C(P¯2). We next invoke the same technique we used in the proof of Theorem 2
in Appendix B to show C(P¯2) is also an upper bound on the sum rate. We prove this statement
by showing if R1 = r1, R2 = r2 is achievable, then R1 = r1 + r2 is also achievable.
Let us construct a message set {Wa} which has the same cardinality of the message set {W2}.
Let part of the secret message be transmitted via Wa. The remaining part of the secret message
be transmitted via W1. The role of W2 is to be the secret key. Let W2 be taken from the set
{W2} according to a uniform distribution. W2 is independent from Wa and W1.
Let ⊕ be the modulus addition defined over {1, ... ‖W2‖}. Node 1, after decoding W2, transmits
Wˆ2⊕Wa over the public channel. Since the public channel is noiseless with continuous input, it
can transmit Wˆ2⊕Wa with less than n channel uses. Because Node 2 knows W2, it can recover
Wa from Wˆ2 ⊕Wa if W2 = Wˆ2.
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The signal available to the eavesdropper now becomes the output of the wiretap channel Xn,
and the output of the public link Wa ⊕W2. Then, by the same derivation in (199)-(215), by
replacing Zn with Xn, we have:
H
(
W1,Wa|Xn,Wa ⊕ Wˆ2
)
(142)
≥H (W1,Wa)− nε (143)
where ε > 0. limn→∞ ε = 0. Hence the rate of W1,Wa is the secrecy rate R1. Since Wa is
chosen from the message set {Wa} according to a uniform distribution, we have R1 = r1 + r2.
Due to the symmetry of the channel model, we can prove that R2 ≤ C(P¯1) and R1 + R2 ≤
C(P¯1) in the same fashion.
This completes the proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the merit of using the signals received by the source node,
i.e., the feedback, for encoder design on achieving a larger secrecy rate region. In order to
answer this question, we studied two models: the Gaussian two-way wiretap channel, and the
Gaussian half-duplex two-way relay channel with an untrusted relay. For each model, we derived
a computable outer bound for the secrecy capacity region. For the first model, by measuring the
gap between the outer bound and the achievable rate region, we find the loss in secrecy rate due
to ignoring the feedback signals can be unbounded. Hence the use of feedback can be highly
beneficial in this model. For the second model, we find the feedback can be safely ignored if
the power of the relay is abundant. In particular, the gap between the achievable rate region and
the outer bound is bounded by 0.5 bit per channel use when the power of the relay goes to ∞.
It is worth mentioning that the achievable rate region in this case is attained via a time sharing
cooperative jamming scheme, which, with its simplicity and near optimum performance, is a
viable alternative to an encoding scheme that utilizes feedback signals.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let ε = ε1 + ε3, where ε1 was defined in (6), and ε3 was defined in (8). To simplify the
notation, we use M ′2 to denote {M2,W2}. Then we have:
H (W1)− nε (144)
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≤H (W1|Zn)−H
(
W1|Zn, Xnf , Y n,M ′2
)
(145)
=I
(
W1;M
′
2, X
n
f , Y
n|Zn
)
(146)
=I
(
W1;X
n
f |Zn, Y n,M ′2
)
+ I (W1;M
′
2, Y
n|Zn) (147)
=I (W1;M
′
2, Y
n|Zn) (148)
≤I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ;M
′
2, Y
n|Zn
)
(149)
=I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ;M
′
2, Y
n, Zn
)
− I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ;Z
n
)
(150)
where in (145) follows from (6) and (8). Note that since, in this proof, we are only bounding
the rate of W1, we omit W2 from the condition term of (6). (148) is based on the fact that Xnf
is a deterministic function of Y n−1 and M ′2, as shown in (4).
Then we rewrite the first term in (150) as:
I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ;M
′
2, Y
n, Zn
)
(151)
=I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Yn|Zn,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1, Zn,M ′2
)
(152)
For the first term in (152), we have:
I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Yn|Zn,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
(153)
=I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Yn|Xf,n, Zn,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
(154)
≤h (Yn|Zn, Xf,n)− h
(
Yn|Xf,n,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn,W1,M1, Y nf
)
(155)
=h (Yn|Zn, Xf,n)− h
(
Yn|Xf,n, Xn,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn,W1,M1, Y nf
)
(156)
=h (Yn|Zn, Xf,n)− h (Yn|Xf,n, Xn, Zn) (157)
=I (Xn; Yn|Zn, Xf,n) (158)
In (154), we use the fact that Xf,n is a deterministic function of {M ′2, Y n−1}, as shown by (4).
In (156), we use the fact that Xn is a deterministic function of {W1,M1, Y n−1f }, as shown by
(3). In (157), we use the fact that
Yn − {Xf,n, Xn, Zn} − {M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1,W1,M1, Y nf } (159)
is a Markov chain, due to (1) and the channel being memoryless and the fact that encoding
functions are causal. In particular, (1) allows us to remove Yf,n from the condition term. Applying
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this result, we find that (150) is upper bounded by
I (Xn; Yn|Zn, Xf,n) + I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn
)
(160)
The second term in (160) can be rewritten as:
I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn
)
(161)
=I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn
)
+ I
(
Yf,n; Y
n−1,M ′2|W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn
)
(162)
The second term in (162) can be upper bounded as:
I
(
Yf,n; Y
n−1,M ′2|W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn
)
(163)
=I
(
Yf,n; Y
n−1,M ′2|Xn,W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn
)
(164)
=h
(
Yf,n|Xn,W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn
)
− h
(
Yf,n|Xn,W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn, Y n−1,M ′2
)
(165)
≤h (Yf,n|Xn, Zn)− h
(
Yf,n|Xn,W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn, Y n−1,M ′2
)
(166)
=h (Yf,n|Xn, Zn)− h
(
Yf,n|Xf,n, Xn, Zn,W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1, Y n−1,M ′2
)
(167)
=h (Yf,n|Xn, Zn)− h (Yf,n|Xf,n, Xn, Zn) (168)
=I(Xf,n; Yf,n|Xn, Zn) (169)
In (164), we use the fact that Xn is a deterministic function of {W1,M1, Y n−1f }, as shown by
(3). In (167), we use the fact that Xf,n is a deterministic function of M ′2, Y n−1, as shown by
(4). In (168), we use the fact that
Yf,n − {Xf,n, Xn, Zn} − {W1,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1, Y n−1,M ′2} (170)
is a Markov chain. This is because the encoding functions are causal and the channel is mem-
oryless.
Applying this result, we find that that (160) is now upper bounded by
I (Xn; Yn|Zn, Xf,n) + I(Xf,n; Yf,n|Xn, Zn) + I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn
)
(171)
The last term in (171) can be rewritten as
I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ;Zn|Y n−1,M ′2, Zn−1
)
− I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ;Zn|Zn−1
)
(172)
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The second term and the last term in (172) can be upper bounded together:
I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ;Zn|M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
− I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ;Zn|Zn−1
)
(173)
=− I
(
Zn;M
′
2, Y
n−1|Zn−1
)
− h
(
Zn|W1,M1, Y n−1f ,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Zn−1,W1,M1, Y n−1f
)
(174)
≤− h
(
Zn|W1,M1, Y n−1f ,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Zn−1,W1,M1, Y n−1f
)
(175)
=− h
(
Zn|Xn, Xf,n,W1,M1, Y n−1f ,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Xn, Zn−1,W1,M1, Y n−1f
)
(176)
≤− h
(
Zn|Xn, Xf,n,W1,M1, Y n−1f ,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h (Zn|Xn) (177)
=− h (Zn|Xn, Xf,n) + h (Zn|Xn) (178)
=I(Xf,n;Zn|Xn) (179)
In (176), we use the fact that Xn is a deterministic function of {W1,M1, Y n−1f }, and Xf,n is a
deterministic function of {M ′2, Y n−1}. In (178), we use the fact that
Zn − {Xn, Xf,n} − {W1,M1, Y n−1f ,M ′2, Y n−1, Zn−1} (180)
is a Markov chain. This is due to the fact that the channel is memoryless and the encoding
functions (3) and (4) are causal.
Applying this result to (172), we find that that (171) is now upper bounded by:
I (Xn; Yn|Xf,n, Zn) + I(Xf,n; Yf,n, Zn|Xn) + I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn−1
)
(181)
Hence we have shown that
H(W1)− nε ≤ I
(
W1,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n,M ′2|Zn
)
≤ I (Xn; Yn|Xf,n, Zn) + I (Xf,n; Yf,n, Zn|Xn)
+ I
(
W1,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M ′2|Zn−1
)
(182)
Applying this result repeatedly for n− 1, n− 2, ..., 1, we have
1
n
H(W1)− ε (183)
≤1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi; Yi|Xf,i, Zi) + I(Xf,i; Yf,i, Zi|Xi)) (184)
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Fig. 13. Two-way wiretap channel with a public noiseless forward link
Define Q as a random variable that is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., n}. Define X =
XQ, Y = YQ, Z = ZQ, Xf = Xf,Q, Yf = Yf,Q. Then the right hand side of (184) equals:
I(X ; Y |Z,Xf , Q) + I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X,Q) (185)
≤I (X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X) (186)
where we use the fact that Y −{Z,Xf , X}−Q is a Markov chain and {Yf , Z}−{X,Xf}−Q
is a Markov chain. Applying this result in (184) and let n→∞, we obtained the upper bound
in the theorem.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Equation (47) follows from removing the eavesdropper and applying the bounds of two-way
channel from [1]. Equation (48) can be derived similarly thanks to the symmetry of the channel
model.
We next derive (49). We focus on the first term inside the minimum in (49). The second term
can be derived similarly thanks to the symmetry of the channel model.
First we add a public noiseless broadcast channel to the channel in Figure 1. The new channel
model is shown in Figure 13. The broadcast channel takes the input from Node 1. Its outputs
are received by Node 2 and the eavesdropper. Since the channel is noiseless, the outputs equal
the input, and is denoted by XC . XC is continuous. The introduction of the public noiseless
broadcast channel certainly does not decrease the secrecy capacity region. Hence, to upper bound
the secrecy capacity region of the original channel, we can consider this new model instead. We
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next apply Theorem 1 to this channel, which says R1 is bounded by
I(X,XC ; Y,XC |Z,XC, Xf) + I(Xf ; Yf , Z,XC|X,XC) (187)
The first term in (187) is upper bounded by:
I (X,XC ; Y,XC |Z,XC, Xf) =I (X ; Y |Z,XC, Xf) (188)
=h (Y |Z,XC, Xf)− h (Y |Z,X,XC, Xf) (189)
≤h (Y |Z,Xf)− h (Y |Z,X,XC, Xf) (190)
=h (Y |Z,Xf)− h (Y |Z,X,Xf) (191)
=I (X ; Y |Z,Xf) (192)
In (191) we use the fact that Y − {Z,X,Xf} −XC is a Markov chain.
The second term is (187) is upper bounded by:
I (Xf ; Yf , Z,XC|X,XC) (193)
=I (Xf ; Yf , Z|X,XC) (194)
≤h (Yf , Z|X)− h (Yf , Z|X,Xf , XC) (195)
=h (Yf , Z|X)− h (Yf , Z|X,Xf) (196)
=I (Xf ; Yf , Z|X) (197)
In (196) we use the fact that {Yf , Z} − {X,Xf} −XC is a Markov chain.
Hence (187) is upper bounded by
I(X ; Y |Z,Xf) + I(Xf ; Yf , Z|X) (198)
This means introducing a public noiseless forward channel brings no change in the expression
of the upper bound of R1.
We next prove (198) is also an upper bound on R1 + R2. This is done by showing if R1 =
r1, R2 = r2 is achievable, then R1 = r1 + r2 is also achievable.
Construct a message set {Wa} which has the same cardinality of the message set {W2}. Let
part of the secret message be transmitted via Wa. The remaining part of the secret message is
transmitted via W1. The role of W2 is to serve as a secret key. Let W2 be taken from the set
{W2} according to a uniform distribution. W2 is independent from Wa and W1.
39
Let ⊕ be the modulus addition defined over {1, ... ‖W2‖}, where ‖W2‖ is the cardinality of
the set {W2}. Recall that Wˆ2 denote the result obtained by Node 1 when it tries to decode W2.
We let Node 1 transmit Wˆ2⊕Wa over the public channel. Since the public channel is noiseless
with continuous input, it can transmit Wˆ2 ⊕ Wa with a single channel use. Because Node 2
knows W2, it can recover Wa from Wˆ2 ⊕Wa when W2 = Wˆ2.
The signal available to the eavesdropper now becomes the output of the wiretap channel
Zn, and the output of the public link, which is Wa ⊕ Wˆ2. Conditioned on these signals, the
equivocation of W1,Wa can be computed as:
H
(
W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕ Wˆ2
)
(199)
≥H
(
W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕ Wˆ2,Wa ⊕W2
)
(200)
=H
(
W1,Wa,Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
−H
(
Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
(201)
=H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2) +H
(
Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|W1,Wa, Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
−H
(
Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
(202)
≥H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2)−H
(
Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
(203)
≥H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2)−H
(
Wa ⊕ Wˆ2|Wa, Zn,Wa ⊕W2
)
(204)
=H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2)−H
(
Wˆ2|Wa, Zn,W2
)
(205)
≥H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2)−H
(
Wˆ2|W2
)
(206)
≥H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2)− nε (207)
In (207) we use the fact that W2 can be reliably decoded by Node 1. Hence (207) follows from
Fano’s inequality.
The first term in (207) can be bounded as follows:
H (W1,Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2) (208)
=H (Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2) +H (W1|Zn,Wa,Wa ⊕W2) (209)
=H (Wa|Zn,Wa ⊕W2) +H (W1|Zn,Wa,W2) (210)
=H (Wa|Wa ⊕W2) +H (W1|Zn,Wa,W2) (211)
=H (Wa|Wa ⊕W2) +H (W1|Zn,W2) (212)
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=H (Wa) +H (W1|Zn,W2) (213)
≥H (Wa) +H (W1)− nε (214)
≥H (W1,Wa)− nε (215)
Equation (211) is due to the fact that Zn is independent from Wa,W2, which leads to:
I (Wa;Z
n|Wa ⊕W2) ≤ I (Wa,Wa ⊕W2;Zn) = I (Wa,W2;Zn) = 0 (216)
Equation (212) follows from the fact that Wa is independent from Zn,W1,W2. Equation (214)
follows from the fact that collective secrecy implies one message is secure even if the other
message is revealed to the eavesdropper [12].
The argument above shows the rate of W1,Wa is the secrecy rate R1. Since Wa is chosen
from the message set {Wa} according to a uniform distribution, we have R1 = r1 + r2.
Therefore R1 +R2 is upper bounded by (198).
Hence we have proved the theorem.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We prove R1 = R∗1, R2 = 0 is achievable. The achievability of R1 = 0, R2 = R∗2 can be
proved similarly due to the symmetry of the channel model.
The communication is divided into two phases:
1) The first phase lasts n channel uses. During it, Node 2 sends a key K to Node 1. At the
same time, Node 1 performs cooperative jamming by transmitting an i.i.d. Gaussian noise
sequence with power P .
2) The second phase lasts n¯ channel uses, during which Node 1 encrypts the confidential
message W with K, and sends the result back to Node 2. At the same time, Node 2
performs cooperative jamming by transmitting an i.i.d. Gaussian noise sequence with power
Pr.
Let α = n/(n+ n¯) be the time sharing factor of the first phase. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and α is a constant.
The following notation is used in the remainder of the proof: x¯ denotes any signal x which is
related to the second phase. Otherwise, the signal is related to the first phase. With this notation,
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the signals received by the eavesdropper during the two phases are given by:
Zn =
√
h1X
n +
√
h2X
n
f +N
n
2 (217)
Z¯ n¯ =
√
h1X¯
n¯ +
√
h1X¯
n¯
f + N¯
n¯
2 (218)
The codebooks used by Node 1 and 2 are denoted by C1 and C2 respectively and are generated
in the following way:
C2 is composed of i.i.d. sequences sampled from the Gaussian distribution N (0, Pr). The
codebook is then randomly binned into several bins. The size of the codebook depends on the
number of bins needed to represent the key K and the size of the bin necessary to confuse the
eavesdropper. Specifically, the size of the bin is chosen to be
2
⌊n(C
(
h2Pr
h1P+1
)
−ǫ)⌋ (219)
where ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer smaller or equal to x, ǫ > 0 and limn→∞ ǫ = 0.
Let RK be the rate of the secret key. Then there are 2nRK bins. RK is given by:
0 < RK =
1
n
H (K|C1, C2) < min


[
C (Pr)− C
(
h2Pr
h1P + 1
)]+
, C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)
 (220)
Observe that the key rate is chosen to be smaller than
[
C (Pr)− C
(
h2Pr
h1P+1
)]+
to keep the key
K secret from the eavesdropper. As will be shown later, the key is used to compensate the rate
loss of the forward channel needed to confuse to eavesdropper. Hence, the rate of the key is
chosen not to exceed this rate loss, which leads to the term C
(
h1P
h2Pr+1
)
in (220).
C1 is composed of 2nRK codebooks. Each codebook is composed of i.i.d. sequences sampled
from the Gaussian distribution N (0, P ), and is composed of 2n¯C(P ) i.i.d. Gaussian sequences.
The sequences of each codebook are randomly binned into several bins. The size of each bin is
chosen to be:
2
⌊(n¯C
(
h1P
h2Pr+1
)
−nRK−n¯ǫ1)⌋ (221)
where ǫ1 > 0 and limn→∞ ǫ1 = 0.
During the first phase, Node 2 generates a secret key K according to a uniform distribution
over {1, ..., 2nRK} and selects the bin from C2 according to K. Then it chooses a codeword from
this bin according to a uniform distribution and transmits it to Node 1.
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Since Node 1 is transmitting an i.i.d. Gaussian noise sequence during the first phase, the
channel model in this phase is equivalent to the Gaussian wiretap channel [29], which uses the
same codebook and encoding scheme as we do here. Reference [29] proves that, by doing so,
K is kept secret from the eavesdropper and can be reliably decoded by Node 1. That is:
1
n
I (K;Zn|C1, C2) ≤ ε (222)
lim
n→∞E[Pr(Kˆ 6= K|C1, C2)] = 0 (223)
where ε ≥ 0, lim
n→∞ ε = 0.
Let Kˆ be the estimate of K Node 1 decodes from its received signal. Node 1 computes its
transmitted signals as follows: It first chooses the codebook according to the key Kˆ it decoded
from the first phase. Then, it chooses the bin from the codebook according to the secret message
W . Finally, it chooses the transmitted codeword from this bin according to a uniform distribution.
If Kˆ = K, then Node 2 knows the sub-codebook used by Node 1. The sub-codebook is
composed of i.i.d. Gaussian sequences and its rate is within the AWGN channel capacity between
Node 1 and Node 2. This observation, along with (223), leads to the following fact:
lim
n¯→∞E[Pr(Wˆ 6= W |C1, C2)] = 0 (224)
We next bound the equivocation
H
(
W |Zn, Z¯ n¯, C1, C2
)
(225)
It is understood that C1, C2 is always on the condition term. Hence, we omit it in the sequel to
simplify the notation and reinstate it only when necessary.
The equivocation rate is then bounded as follows:
H
(
W |Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
=H
(
X¯ n¯,W |Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
−H
(
X¯ n¯|W,Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
(226)
≥H
(
X¯ n¯,W |Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (227)
=H
(
W |Zn, Z¯ n¯, X¯ n¯
)
+H
(
X¯ n¯|Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (228)
=H
(
X¯ n¯|Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (229)
=H
(
X¯ n¯|Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
−H
(
X¯ n¯
)
+H
(
X¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (230)
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=H
(
X¯ n¯
)
− I
(
X¯ n¯;Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (231)
=H
(
X¯ n¯
)
− I
(
X¯ n¯; Z¯ n¯
)
− I
(
X¯ n¯;Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− n¯ε (232)
Here (227) follows from the fact that given W , the number of possible X¯ n¯ equals the cardinality
of the bin that corresponds to W from all the 2nRK codebooks, which is 2n¯(C
(
h1P
h2Pr+1
)
−ǫ1)
. Note
that these candidates of X¯ n¯ form a Gaussian codebook by itself with a rate of C
(
h1P
h2Pr+1
)
−
ǫ1. Since Node 2 is transmitting i.i.d. Gaussian noise, the channel between Node 1 and the
eavesdropper is an AWGN channel whose capacity is C
(
h1P
h2Pr+1
)
. Therefore, given W , the
eavesdropper can determine X¯ n¯ from Z¯ n¯ using joint typical decoding. (227) then follows by
applying Fano’s inequality.
Equation (229) follows since W is a deterministic function of X¯ n¯.
The third term in (232) can then be bounded as follows:
I
(
X¯ n¯;Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
=h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯, X¯ n¯
)
(233)
=h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Zn|X¯ n¯f + N¯ n¯2 , X¯ n¯
)
(234)
=h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Zn|X¯ n¯
)
(235)
≤h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Zn|X¯ n¯, K
)
(236)
=h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h (Zn|K) (237)
=h
(
Zn|Z¯ n¯
)
− h (Zn)− h (Zn|K) + h (Zn) (238)
=I (Zn;K)− I
(
Zn; Z¯ n¯
)
(239)
≤I (Zn;K) ≤ nε2 (240)
Equation (235) is because X¯ n¯f + N¯ n¯2 is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian noise, which is independent
from Zn and X¯ n¯.
Equation (237) follows from the fact that Zn −K − X¯ n¯ is a Markov chain. Equation (240)
follows from (222).
Substituting (240) into (232), we have
H
(
W |Zn, Z¯ n¯
)
(241)
≥H
(
X¯ n¯
)
− I
(
X¯ n¯; Z¯ n¯
)
− (n¯ε+ nε2) (242)
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The second term in (242) can be bounded as follows. For this purpose, we reinstate the C1, C2
on the condition term:
I
(
X¯ n¯; Z¯ n¯|C1, C2
)
(243)
≤h
(
Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Z¯ n¯|X¯ n¯, C1, C2
)
(244)
=h
(
Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Z¯ n¯|X¯ n¯, C1, C2
)
(245)
=h
(
Z¯ n¯
)
− h
(
Z¯ n¯|X¯ n¯
)
(246)
=I
(
X¯ n¯; Z¯ n¯
)
(247)
=n¯I
(
X¯ ; Z¯
)
(248)
Equation (246) follows from the fact that given X¯ n¯, Z¯ n¯ only depends on the jamming signal and
channel noise. Therefore, we can drop codebooks C1, C2 from the conditioning term. Equation
(248) follows from the fact that Node 2 transmits i.i.d. Gaussian noise during the second phase,
and the code book used by Node 1 is composed of i.i.d. Gaussian sequences.
Since
I
(
X¯ ; Z¯
)
= C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)
(249)
H
(
X¯ n¯|C1, C2
)
= nRK + n¯C (P ) (250)
we have
H
(
W |Zn, Z¯ n¯, C1, C2
)
(251)
= (nRK + n¯C (P ))− n¯C
(
h1P
h2Pr + 1
)
− (n¯ε+ nε2) (252)
≥H(W |C1, C2)− (n¯(ε+ ǫ1) + nε2) (253)
Therefore 0 ≤ I(W ;Zn, Z¯ n¯|C1, C2) < (n¯(ε+ ǫ1) + nε2). This, along with (224), gives us:
lim
n,n¯→∞
1
n+ n¯
I(W ;Zn, Z¯ n¯|C1, C2) + E[Pr(Wˆ 6= W )|C1, C2] = 0 (254)
From the linearity of expectation and non-negativity of mutual information and probability, we
see that there must exists codebooks C1 = C∗1 , C2 = C∗2 such that both terms on the left hand side
of (254) go to 0 as n, n¯ → ∞. This observation, along with that fact that n + n¯ channel uses
are involved, proves that the secrecy rate pair (R∗1, 0) is achievable.
Hence we have proved the theorem.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Since received signals are not used to compute transmitting signals at Node j, j = 1, 2, we
let α = 1 in Theorem 6. In this case, when P = kPr, R∗j becomes:
R∗1 = C (P )− C
(
h1
h2k + 1/P
)
(255)
R∗2 = C (kP )− C
(
h2k
h1 + 1/P
)
(256)
The sum rate bound given by Theorem 5 is upper bounded by:
min
{
C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP ) , C
(
kP
h2kP + 1
)
+ C ((h1 + 1)P )
}
(257)
To prove Theorem 7, it is sufficient to show both R∗1 and R∗2 are within constant gaps of (257),
as we show below:
C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− R∗1 (258)
=C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (P ) + C
(
h1
h2k + 1/P
)
(259)
≤C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (P ) + C
(
h1
h2k
)
(260)
≤C
(
1
h1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (P ) + C
(
h1
h2k
)
(261)
=C
(
1
h1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 + (h2 + 1) kP
1 + P
)
+ C
(
h1
h2k
)
(262)
≤C
(
1
h1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 + max {1, (h2 + 1) k}P
1 + P
)
+ C
(
h1
h2k
)
(263)
≤C
(
1
h1
)
+
1
2
log2 (max {1, (h2 + 1) k}) + C
(
h1
h2k
)
(264)
For R∗2, we have:
C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− R∗2 (265)
=C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (kP ) + C
(
h2k
h1 + 1/P
)
(266)
≤C
(
P
h1P + 1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (kP ) + C
(
h2k
h1
)
(267)
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≤C
(
1
h1
)
+ C ((h2 + 1) kP )− C (kP ) + C
(
h2k
h1
)
(268)
=C
(
1
h1
)
+
1
2
log2
(
1 + (h2 + 1) kP
1 + kP
)
+ C
(
h2k
h1
)
(269)
≤C
(
1
h1
)
+
1
2
log2 (h2 + 1) + C
(
h2k
h1
)
(270)
Hence we have proved the Theorem.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 8
To prove this theorem, we only need show that it is possible to achievable a secrecy rate for
Node 1 that exceeds the upper bound given by Theorem 4. Consider the case when h1 = h2 = 1.
Then by evaluating (57) at σ2 = 0 and σ2 →∞ with ρ = η = 0, we find the secrecy rate R1 is
bounded by
min{C(P ), C(Pr) + 0.5} (271)
when Yf is ignored by Node 1. Choose Pr and P such that
C(Pr) + 0.5 < 0.4C(P ) (272)
For this power configuration, from (271), we observe that R1 is upper bounded by 0.4C(P ).
Let the α in Theorem 6 be 0.5. R∗1 then becomes:
0.5C (P )− 0.5
[
C
(
P
Pr + 1
)
− C (Pr) + C
(
Pr
P + 1
)]+
(273)
A sufficient condition for R∗1 = 0.5C(P ) is that
C
(
P
Pr + 1
)
+ C
(
Pr
P + 1
)
> C (Pr) (274)
It can be verified that this condition is equivalent to(
P
Pr+1
+ 1
)2
P + 1
> 1 (275)
A sufficient condition for it to hold is: (
P
Pr+1
+ 1
)2
(√
P + 1
)2 > 1 (276)
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which means
√
P > Pr + 1 (277)
Choose Pr = P 1/4. For sufficiently large P , both (272) and (277) can be fulfilled. In this case,
the achievable rate is 0.5C(P ), which is greater than the upper bound 0.4C(P ). The difference
is 0.1C(P ), which is not a bounded function of P . Hence we have proved the theorem.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 12
The upper bound I(X ; Y ) follows from removing the eavesdropper and applying the upper
bound for two-way channel from [1]. Hence we only need to prove the second term inside the
minimum.
Let ε = ε4 + ε5, where ε4, ε5 were defined in (111) and (112). Then we have:
H (W )− nε (278)
≤H (W |Zn)−H
(
W |Zn, Xnf , Y n,M2
)
(279)
=I
(
W ;M2, X
n
f , Y
n|Zn
)
(280)
=I
(
W ;Xnf |Zn, Y n,M2
)
+ I (W ;M2, Y
n|Zn) (281)
=I (W ;M2, Y
n|Zn) (282)
≤I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;M2, Y
n|Zn
)
(283)
=I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;M2, Y
n, Zn
)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Z
n
)
(284)
In (279) we use (111) and (112). In (282) we use the fact that Xnf is a deterministic function
of Y n−1 and M2, as shown in (110).
For the first term in (284), we have:
I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;M2, Y
n, Zn
)
(285)
=I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Yn|Zn,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1, Zn−1,M2
)
(286)
For the first term in (286), we have:
I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Yn|Zn,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
(287)
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≤h (Yn|Zn)− h
(
Yn|M2, Y n−1, Zn,W,M1, Y nf
)
(288)
=h (Yn|Zn)− h
(
Yn|Xn,M2, Y n−1, Zn,W,M1, Y nf
)
(289)
=h (Yn|Zn)− h (Yn|Xn, Zn) (290)
=I (Xn; Yn|Zn) (291)
In (289), we use the fact that Xn is a deterministic function of W,M1, Y nf . In (290), we use the
fact that Yn − {Xn, Zn} − {M2, Y n−1, Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf }, since the channel is memoryless and
encoding functions are causal.
Applying this result, we find that (284) is upper bounded by
I (Xn; Yn|Zn) + I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1, Zn−1,M2
)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Z
n
)
(292)
=I (Xn; Yn|Zn) + I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1, Zn−1,M2
)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Z
n−1)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|Zn−1
)
(293)
We next bound the second term and the last term in (293) together, as shown below:
I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Zn|Zn−1
)
(294)
=h
(
Zn|M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
− h
(
Zn|W,M1, Y nf ,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
− h
(
Zn|Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf
)
(295)
=− I
(
Zn;M2, Y
n−1|Zn−1
)
− h
(
Zn|W,M1, Y nf ,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf
)
(296)
≤− h
(
Zn|W,M1, Y nf ,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf
)
(297)
=− h
(
Zn|Xn,W,M1, Y nf ,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1
)
+ h
(
Zn|Xn, Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf
)
(298)
=− h (Zn|Xn) + h (Zn|Xn) (299)
=0 (300)
In (298), we use the fact that Xn is a deterministic function of W,M1, Y nf . In (299), we use
the fact that Zn − Xn − {W,M1, Y nf ,M2, Y n−1, Zn−1} is a Markov chain and Zn − Xn −
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{Zn−1,W,M1, Y nf } is a Markov chain. Both are a consequence of the fact that the channel is
memoryless and the encoding functions (109) and (110) are causal.
Applying this result to (293), we find it is upper bounded by:
I (Xn; Yn|Zn) + I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1, Zn−1,M2
)
− I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ;Z
n−1) (301)
The second term in (301) can be combined with the last term in (301) and expressed as:
I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n−1,M2|Zn−1
)
(302)
=I
(
W,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M2|Zn−1
)
+ I
(
Yf,n; Y
n−1,M2|W,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1
)
(303)
The last term in (303) can be upper bounded as:
I
(
Yf,n; Y
n−1,M2|W,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1
)
(304)
≤h (Yf,n)− h
(
Yf,n|W,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1, Y n−1,M2
)
(305)
=h (Yf,n)− h
(
Yf,n|Xf,n,W,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1, Y n−1,M2
)
(306)
=h (Yf,n)− h (Yf,n|Xf,n) (307)
=I (Xf,n; Yf,n) (308)
In (306), we use the fact that Xf,n is a deterministic function of Y n−1,M2. (307) follows because
Yf,n −Xf,n − {W,M1, Y n−1f , Zn−1, Y n−1,M2} is a Markov chain.
Applying this result to (301), we find (301) can be upper bounded as:
I (Xn; Yn|Zn) + I (Xf,n; Yf,n) + I
(
W,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M2|Zn−1
)
(309)
Hence we have shown
H(W )− nε ≤ I
(
W,M1, Y
n
f ; Y
n,M2|Zn
)
≤ I (Xn; Yn|Zn) + I (Xf,n; Yf,n) + I
(
W,M1, Y
n−1
f ; Y
n−1,M2|Zn−1
)
(310)
Applying this result repeatedly for n− 1, n− 2, ..., 1, we have
1
n
H(W )− ε ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(I(Xi; Yi|Zi) + I(Xf,i; Yf,i)) (311)
Let us define Q as a random variable that is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., n}. Further,
define X = XQ, Y = YQ, Z = ZQ, Xf = Xf,Q, Yf = Yf,Q. Then, the right hand side of (311)
can be expressed as
I(X ; Y |Z,Q) + I(Xf ; Yf |Q) (312)
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≤h (Y |Z)− h (Y |X,Z,Q) + h (Yf)− h (Yf |Xf , Q) (313)
=h (Y |Z)− h (Y |X,Z) + h (Yf)− h (Yf |Xf) (314)
=I (X ; Y |Z) + I (Xf ; Yf) (315)
Applying this result in (303) and letting n→∞, we obtain the upper bound in the theorem.
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